In Bayesian mechanism design, a central question "simple versus optimal" focuses on how well simple mechanisms can approximate the revenue of the optimal mechanism in complex environments. Optimal mechanisms for asymmetric agents are usually both difficult to derive and implement. For general models (e.g., budgeted agents, risk-averse agents), either no closed form characterization is known in the literature, or the optimal mechanisms take the model too literally and are both fragile and impractical. On the other hand, some simple mechanisms (e.g., posting an anonymous price, second-price auction with anonymous reserve) are prevalent broadly.
The left hand side is (α, β)-close for price posting: P is at least R/α on [0, 1/β], i.e., the black thin line is above the black dotted line. The right hand side is ζ -close for ex ante optimization: P is concave, P ′ ≥ R/ζ with P ′ (q) = max q ′ ≤q P(q), i.e., the gray dashed line is above the black dotted line. of anonymous pricings for non-linear-utility agents to the analysis of revenue of anonymous pricings for linear-utility agents. Thus, relative to anonymous pricings, non-linear agent models can be considered well approximated by linear agent models. Second, our analysis reduces the multi-agent question of approximation by an anonymous price to a collection of single-agent approximation questions. These single-agent approximation questions ask whether or not the price-posting revenue curve is a good approximation to the ex ante revenue curve, i.e., whether an approximate regularity holds. Relative to Alaei et al. [2013] , the single-agent problem to which we reduce gives simpler mechanisms. Our approximation ratios for anonymous pricing under various models are summarized in Table 1 . These results follow from analyses of the approximate regularity of each model (Figure 1 ). In the full paper, we also provide examples showing that without our assumptions, neither are the single-agent problems approximately regular nor is anonymous pricing a constant approximation for the multi-agent problem.
As an example, our reduction framework applied to agents with private budgets, regular valuation distributions, and MHR budget distributions is as follows. We show that under these assumption, the price posting revenue curve is concave and the agents are 3-close for ex ante optimization (Figure 1, right) . It follows that the ex ante revenue on {P i } n i=1 is a 3-approximation to the ex ante revenue on {R i } n i=1 . From Alaei et al. [2018] with concavity of {P i } n i=1 , anonymous pricing on {P i } n i=1 is e-approximation to the ex ante revenue on {P i } n i=1 . Combining, anonymous pricing is a 3e-approximation to the optimal ex ante revenue.
